Identity By Reference

I am taking a course on Hume this semester, and I admit is quite interesting to study my intellectual nemesis in such detail.

One thing that has begun to bother me is this notion if identity. Hume makes an admittedly solid case for the impermanence of identity; this does not bother me, as - pragmatically - it makes no difference to me if the world around me is replaced spontaneously with identical copies every time I close my eyes: after all, if the object is numerically identical, then what difference does it make? The attributes I ascribe these objects remain; if I identify Locke, my cat, not through the persistence of her identity over time, but instead through her attributes and qualities, some of which are present in the object so described and some of which are personal labels that I project onto those qualities, then in effect, Locke the cat remains Locke the cat despite not being the "original" Locke the cat, as numerical identity is sufficient, pragmatically speaking, to retain identity.

Obviously, however, numerical identity is not what we generally mean by identity; we want persistence across time, not mere perfect copies. If I speak of Locke the cat, then it should be the "same" Locke the cat over time, not simply numerically identical copies separated by my lack of direct perception of Locke the cat.

So... I'm going to attempt to construct a case for identity here. We'll ignore self-identity for the time being; I have some other thoughts on that, relying on the idea of self-referential consciousness taken from Hofstadter and some other hokey ideas involving special agency and such, which I have probably outlined before.

While this thesis will largely presume a non-substance approach, substances make this argument significantly easier, even probably unnecessary. However, in my book, substance is a very ethereal concept - not in the realm of metaphysics, but very ontologically barren by itself - thus, this concept may yet hold water therein. Further examination of substance is beyond the scope of this post, though.

Let's begin with some basic propositions, and see if they hold water, before we delve too deep.

First, I would assert that we can observe the interactions between objects. If we accept sense-data as being an accurate reflection of the world around us - so ignoring any representation theories and such - we can make, within reason, assertions about the relations between objects. I use the word "relation" very intentionally, as I am making a reference to Hume's work: if we can speak of relations between objects, then that will be very useful. We will gleefully ignore any and all potentially causal relations between objects within our sense data; it is merely useful to observe that these relations exist, of any kind.

Second, we can observe through sense-data, provided an unbroken chain of observation (by which I mean no period of time elapsing in which an object could potentially lose its identity), that one object and another can and do have an effect on one another. If I drop a ball on a pool table, there are a number of events that transpire: the sound of the ball striking the table at least once, the potential movement of the fabric on the table's surface, the movement of the ball itself as it strikes the table. Again the precise causal nature of these events is irrelevant - merely that they are occurring, a "constant conjunction" if you want to use Hume's terminology. Order and causality matter not; only the conjunction of the objects in question in some nebulous relation of some sort.

Third, I would propose that observation is a relation. If objects we behold in our sense-data somehow retains its identity while we observe it, then it is sensible that this could be said to be a relation - there is a relationship between the viewer and the viewed that is preventing loss of identity. But - it is not necessarily just sight, but any sense-data. Thus smell, hearing, touch, all these count as potential relations that prevent loss of identity.

Fourth, I propose that it is impossible - in all but the most catatonic of states - for a human being to utterly remove themselves from the experience of sensation. By this I mean that while we can willfully remove our sight, we cannot voluntarily cease our hearing or touching of objects; we are always aware of at least one object beyond ourselves.

Should these four propositions hold, it should be reasonable to assert that existence does not spontaneously cease to be when we close our senses to it; that objects beyond our ability to perceive yet retain their identity. I shall attempt to present an example of how this is so.

We have an understanding that objects have relations to each other. Just as the pool table and the ball have a relation in our earlier example, so, too, do all other objects have some relation with at least some other object; for an object to have no relation to any other object necessitates that it exists in void, inaccessible in any fashion, and thus may as well not exist.

We can posit that these relations are maintained through our lack of direct sense-data. We do so through our earlier assertions: I am unable to completely close off my perceptions of all sense-data. Through this, I must perceive at least one other object; the precise object, in this instance, is irrelevant.

That one object, however, maintains relations to at least one other object. Thus, while the primary object does not necessarily have sense-data itself, I am aware - through my earlier sense-data - that the primary object (of which I am retaining sense-data) and the secondary (of which I have no direct sense-data at present) have a relation of some kind; this could be said to be a perception of some kind, though objects do not perceive their own relations. "Constant conjunction" would indicate a relation of some kind, and this is a necessary thing, not accidental; the form of the conjunction is again irrelevant, merely the fact that it exists is sufficient for our purposes here.

Through this acknowledgement of a relation of some kind between the primary object and the secondary object, the second object thus retains its identity by reference: the primary object holds a reference to the second through its relation to it, and I retain direct sense-data of the primary object, because I am incapable of not perceiving at least one other object, lest I be in void and thus necessarily nonexistent.

This secondary object, then, has relations to at least one other object, which we shall call the tertiary object. Through prior sense-data I am aware of the existence of this third object and its relation to the second, though I presently observe neither the second nor the third. However, the second object holds a reference to the third, namely its relation to it; thus, I know of the persistence of the identity of the third object through my knowledge of the persistence of the second, which I know through the persistence of the primary, which I know through direct sense-data.

From this, it is a simple case of a logical chain that extends to all objects I have observed: I know of their existence through reference, through their possessing of a relation - of any kind - to another object, and so on and so forth, all the way through to the primary object, of which I retain direct sense-data.

Now, two arguments become immediately apparent: first, that I cannot know of objects of which I have no prior sense-data, and thus these objects are entirely capable of losing their persistence of identity; and second, that it is entirely possible that the primary object's only reference is to myself, as objects must admit of at least a single relation, and it is possible for only a pair of objects to exist in this model.

To the first objection, I would argue that my direct awareness of a relation between objects is unnecessary for them to maintain identity, but merely that the object has a relation of some kind to any object of which I have had awareness. I need not know whether or not a new desk has been placed in the room next door; but, because I am aware of at least one object to which that desk has a relation, that desk must have persistent identity, because it will be referenced, through a logical chain, by an object of which I am aware - namely, the primary object. If the unknown object does not exist in void, then it must necessarily exist with at least one other object; so long as one of the objects in its referential chain exists such that it holds a reference to an object that belongs to my referential chain, then the object becomes part of my referential chain, and thus it retains its identity. Thus while I am unaware of the desk, I am aware of the room it is in, the floor upon which it rests, the door through which I enter the room, and so forth - of these things I have had perceptions, and these objects retain their identity through my referential chain, thus the desk must necessarily retain its identity through reference to these objects of which I am aware.

The rebuttal to the second objection is much the same as the first. However, I will allow that it is possible for an object's referential chain to hold no reference to any object within my referential chain; in this instance, however, I would argue that then it is impossible for that object to ever be within my referential chain.

As we have demonstrated earlier, relations are held between objects even when not subject to direct sense-data; thus, even if we are unaware of a particular relation, it necessarily must still exist. If I close my eyes, the relation between the pool table and the ball upon it does not change - the two objects reference each other. From this, we can conclude that my action of observation was not a necessary component of the reference. Thus, references are qualities of the world and the objects within it, not ascribed to them by an observer. In such a world, then, an object which holds no reference to any object within my referential chain must necessarily not exist, as my referential chain will eventually hold reference to all objects that exist - thus, if an object cannot be referenced, it does not exist.

Through this argument, we have removed the need for observers capable of processing sense-data. Observation is not a necessary component of the formation of these relations, merely the realization of them. Because the precise nature of the relation is irrelevant, merely that it exists, then any relation will suffice; and if my lack of direct perception of a relation between objects is not necessary to maintain that relation, then I need not ever perceive that relation directly in order to establish that it exists.

Thus, objects that have relations maintain those relations. As sense-data is a relation, and was the key component of objects maintaining identity persistence, it can be stated that it is a relation - of any kind - that forces an object to maintain an identity. As we observe relations, and can retain knowledge of the identity of distant objects through a referential chain that includes objects to which we retain immediate sense-data, we can realize that these relations are independent of our observations. In such a world, if relations are the only necessary component to maintain identity, and objects retain reference to other objects, which is itself a relation, then all objects that exist maintain their identity through being a link in a referential chain.